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False failure returns are products that are returned by consumers to retailers with no functional or 
cosmetic defect. The cost of a false failure return includes the processing actions of testing, 
refurbishing if necessary, repackaging, the loss in value during the time the product spends in the 
reverse supply chain (a time that can exceed several months for many firms), and the loss in 
revenue because the product is sold at a discounted price. This cost is significant, and is incurred 
primarily by the manufacturer. Reducing false failure returns, however, requires effort primarily 
by the retailer, for example informing consumers about the exact product that best fits their 
needs. We address the problem of reducing false failure returns via supply chain coordination 
methods. Specifically, we propose a target rebate contract that pays the retailer a specific dollar 
amount per each unit of false failure returns below a target. This target rebate provides an 
incentive to the retailer to increase her effort, thus decreasing the number of false failures and 
(potentially) increasing net sales. We show that this contract is Pareto–improving in the majority 
of cases. Our results also indicate that the profit improvement to both parties, and the supply 
chain, is substantial.     
 
1. Introduction 
 Product returns represent a growing financial concern for firms in the United States and 
the rest of the world, with recent estimates reaching $100 billion annually for the United States 
alone (Stock et al. 2002).  Product returns are a result of two phenomena: consumer returns of 
products to the retailer during a 30, 60 or even 90 day return period, and product overstocks 
returned to the manufacturer by the retailer. Consumer product returns can occur at any time 
during the product life cycle, and are increasingly important to manufacturers. Hewlett–Packard 
(HP) recently discovered that the total costs of consumer product returns for North America 
exceed 2% of total outbound revenue (Reiss 2003).   
  Product overstocks are the subject of a large body of research, but are not directly related to 
the problem of consumer product returns since overstocks encompass units that were never sold 
to the final customer and are only returned at the end of the product lifecycle. Consumer product 
returns are driven by the ‘consumer is king’ attitude prevalent in the United States and supported 
by liberal product returns policies at most major retailers. Consumer product returns to the 
retailer are far less common in the European Union and the rest of the world, but many countries 
mandate some form of return period for Internet and catalog sales. The problems and costs of 
consumer product returns are projected to grow and many firms are just beginning to form teams 
to develop strategies and tactics to reduce the overall costs (Reiss 2003).   
Consumer return rates range from 5-9 percent of sales for most retailers and up to 35 percent 
for fashion apparel (Toktay 2003). A percentage of these returns occur due to true product 
failure, however, a large percentage of returns have no verifiable functional defect. We refer to 
this class of consumer product returns as false failure returns; returns that have no functional or 
cosmetic defect. Managers cite a number of reasons why false failure returns occur, including: 
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installation difficulties, product performance incompatibility with consumer preferences, and 
remorse (Kumar, Guide and Van Wassenhove 2002). For HP’s inkjet printer group, false failure 
returns can account for up to 80% of their inkjet printer returns (Davey 2001). Since HP’s total 
consumer product returns average slightly higher than 6% of sales, false failure returns average 
approximately 5% of sales. As of 1999, HP’s inkjet printer division handled over 50,000 
consumer returns per month in North America (Davey 2001). The problem also persists outside 
of the high-tech industry. At Bosch Power Tools North America, false failure returns account for 
2% of sales (Valenta 2002). In the United Kingdom, manufacturers are seeing an increasing 
number of consumer returns to retailers disguised as ‘defective’ products (Helbig 2002). Because 
of the significant financial impact, manufacturers are interested in reducing false failure returns 
through improved relations and contracts with retailers.   
Not all manufacturers require that retailers return any products returned by consumers. HP 
and Bosch are highly brand name conscious and have a policy that a product returned for any 
reason must be returned to their product returns centers. A manufacturer may allow a retailer to 
sell a returned item if there is nothing wrong with it. However, the determination of whether or 
not a product is defective is not always clear, and this practice allows gaming by consumers. Best 
Buy Co. has publicly announced that it will seek to discourage ‘devil’ customers, customers who 
frequently return products and then buy them back at open box discounts, from shopping at the 
store (McWilliams 2004). Other retailers are also getting aggressive about identifying customers 
with excessive returns by tracking all customer returns through a centralized database and 
refusing returns after a dollar threshold is reached (Cha 2004). These aggressive practices are 
controversial with consumers and a sign that retailers are becoming concerned with the costs 
associated with product returns.    
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When a manufacturer receives a false failure return, the product is routed through the firm’s 
reverse supply chain involving several testing steps and repackaging before the product can 
become available for sale at a secondary market, typically at a price discount. The cost of a false 
failure return includes the processing actions of testing, refurbishing if necessary1, repackaging, 
the loss in value during the time the product spends in the reverse supply chain (a time that can 
exceed several months for many firms), and the loss in revenue because the product is sold at a 
discounted price. Thus, the cost of false failure returns is significant. The per–unit cost of a false 
failure return for computer manufacturers, including HP, is around 25% of the product’s price.   
Table 1 shows information provided by HP about why consumers return products and what 
actions can be taken to eliminate the cause. The manufacturer can make design changes, but only 
in the long run (i.e., the next product generation). For the retailer, however, there are a number of 
actions that may be undertaken in the near term.  A retailer may spend extra time with customers 
and listen to their needs before recommending a particular product. By doing so, customers have 
a higher probability of purchasing a product that matches their needs the first time. Retailers may 
also train their sales force so that the proper operating procedures of a product are clearly 
explained to customers upon purchase. After–sales support by the retailer may also reduce the 
number of false failure returns from customers who have trouble configuring the new product so 
that it performs as expected. We focus on the retailer in our research since the manufacturer is 
already motivated to improve the product design with each generation, but recognizes that design 
changes will only solve a portion of the problem. Providing an incentive for the retailer to reduce 
returns provides a fast solution to a sizeable percentage of the reasons products are returned. 
 
 
                                                 
1 While false failure returns still perform functionally, they require cleaning and sometimes updating (e.g., software 
driver updates) to bring them up to the specifications of the new products being sold when they will reenter the 
marketplace.  
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Table 1- Reasons products are returned 
Rationale for Return Percentage Solutions 
True failure 20 Design 





Design, Retail Pre-Sales Qualification 
Packaging 2.25 Design, Retail Pre-Sales Qualification 
Sales Technique 12.75 Retail Pre-Sales Qualification 
Consumer Behavior 12.5 Retail Policy 
  
HP, along with most of their direct competitors, offers a customer returns policy to the retailer 
where the retailer receives full credit at the unit wholesale price. While the retailer incurs 
minimal processing and loss of goodwill costs, the manufacturer absorbs the majority of the false 
failure return costs. In turn, the manufacturer receives the majority of the benefits from reducing 
false failure returns. The short–term cost to reduce the number of false failure returns, however, 
may be incurred primarily by the retailer as explained above. Since the retailer incurs all effort–
related costs but, not as many benefits from reducing the number of false failure returns, there is 
a need for contracts that coordinate the supply chain such that interests are aligned. 
To address this coordination problem, we propose a target rebate contract that pays the 
retailer a specific dollar amount per each unit of false failure returns below a target T. This target 
rebate provides an incentive to the retailer to increase her effort of informing consumers about 
the exact product that best fits their needs, thus decreasing the number of false failure returns.  
We show that this contract is Pareto–improving in the majority of cases. Additionally, we show 
that increased retailer’s effort produces a magnitude of expected profit improvement per 
expected return of 31% for the supply chain, where profit is defined as revenues minus the costs 
associated with false failure returns. Profit improvements for the manufacturer and the retailer 
depend on the uncertainty in the distribution of false failure returns process.   
This paper is organized as follows. In §2, we review the relevant literature. We define our 
model in §3 and present and discuss a numerical study in §4. In §5, we give examples where 
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traditional forward contracts may lead to gaming by the retailer that increases the number of 
false failures. We also offer a forward contract design that eliminates the misalignment in 
incentives for both the double marginalization problem and the effort to reduce false failure 
returns. We conclude in §6.       
2. Literature review 
 Our research draws on two separate research streams; closed-loop supply chains and 
supply chain coordination contracts. In this section we provide an overview of recent work in 
each area and examine the implications for our research.  
Closed-loop supply chains 
There is a growing body of literature on closed-loop supply chains, where both the forward 
and reverse flows of materials are considered. For example, a recent feature issue of Interfaces 
(33(6) 2003) focuses on the practice of closed-loop supply chains in a variety of industry 
settings. Guide and Van Wassenhove (2003) identify the common processes required by a 
closed-loop supply chain: product acquisition, reverse logistics, inspection, testing and 
disposition, remanufacturing, and selling and distribution. 
General overviews of reverse logistics and remanufacturing are presented by Fleischmann 
(2001), and Guide (2000). We also refer the reader to the book, edited by Guide and Van 
Wassenhove (2003), from the First Workshop on Business Aspects of Closed-Loop Supply 
Chains. Historically, the operational aspects of remanufacturing have received the most attention, 
with numerous publications dealing with production planning and control (e.g., Ferrer and 
Ketzenberg 2004; Souza et al. 2002), and inventory control (e.g., Toktay et al. 2000; van der 
Laan et al. 1999). Ironically, product recovery is often viewed as a narrowly focused, technical 
operational problem without visibility at the corporate level. At Hewlett–Packard Company, 
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customer returns were treated as a low–level divisional problem until a thorough analysis 
showed that the total cost of product returns was equivalent to 2 percent of total outbound sales 
(Davey 2001). Unfortunately, academic research often tends to reinforce this limited view with 
its narrow focus on local optimization of operational issues.    
More recent research efforts, however, have started to analyze the strategic interaction among 
the closed–loop supply chain players. Heese et al. (2003) consider the potential competitive 
advantage for a company actively engaging in product take-back via a game-theoretic model. 
Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) recommend incentives to the original equipment manufacturer 
to increase the fraction of remanufacturable products available, or to decrease the costs of 
remanufacturing. Savaskan et al. (2004) develop a game-theoretic model that addresses the 
issues of channel choice and coordination of the channel. Debo et al. (2001) investigate the joint 
pricing and production technology problem of a manufacturer that offers both new and 
remanufactured products. Ferguson and Toktay (2004) explore how remanufacturing practices 
can be used strategically to deter competition.   
Most of the research focus on product returns to date is on end-of-life product returns or 
overstocks. Our focus, however is on consumer product returns, an area with little academic 
research; one exception is the recent work by Souza et al. (2004). They argue that returns are 
often time sensitive and firms frequently lose much of the value remaining in their returned 
products by not making quick disposition decisions. Their research focuses on the appropriate 
reverse supply chain design, responsive or efficient, based on the rate of value decay.  Our 
research is complimentary. Preventing false failure returns increases the revenue from lost sales 
while reducing the unnecessary expenses of product return, inspection, disposition and 
distribution for reuse. 
Supply chain contracting and returns policies 
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The pioneer work of Pasternack (1985) shows that if a manufacturer sells products to a 
retailer under demand uncertainty with a constant wholesale price per unit (higher than the 
manufacturer’s cost but lower than the retail price) the retailer usually stocks less than the supply 
chain’s optimal quantity. From a marketing perspective, Wood (2001) examines how returns 
policies affect consumer purchase probability and return rates. Wood shows that more lenient 
policies tend to increase product returns, but that the increase in sales is sufficient to create a 
positive net sales effect. Other research focuses on the problem of how to set a returns policy 
between a manufacturer and a retailer and the use of incentives to control the returns flow 
(Padmanabhan and Png 1997 1995, Pasternack 1985, Davis et al. 1995, Tsay 2001). Choi et al. 
(2004) study the effect of an e-marketplace on a returns policy in which internet auctions are 
used to recover value from the stream of product returns. 
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to this problem with a focus on 
appropriate contracts––a transfer payment from the manufacturer to the retailer, which provides 
incentives for retailers to stock a level of inventory that is optimal for the entire supply chain.    
Cachon (2003) provides a thorough review on these type contracts. Contracts based on rebates 
are of particular importance to our research. Based on agency theory, the provision of incentives 
for managerial effort is necessary when effort is not directly observable. Taylor (2002) offers an 
application of channel rebates to induce forward supply chain coordination when demand is 
dependent on the sales effort of the retailer. We propose a similar type contract to induce the 
supply chain optimal amount of effort to reduce the number of false failure returns; we choose a 
rebate–type contract because the number of false failure returns per period is dependent on 
retailer effort and random; as a result retailer effort is unobservable by the manufacturer.   
There is also a well-established body of research on the use of sales quotas to motivate sales 
performance. In this research, as in ours, direct effort on the part of the salesperson is not directly 
 7
observable (Davis and Farley 1971, Tapiero and Farley 1975, Darmon 1979). Much of the 
research is concerned with determining the residual effect of past selling effort and estimating 
the sales-effort-effectiveness functions. There are controlled experiments which show that (1) 
higher quotas lead to higher levels of effort on the part of sales people (Winer 1973), and (2) a 
quota set too high leads to a decrease in effort on the part of sales people (Chowdhury 1993). 
Gaba and Kalra (1999) also shows that with a high quota, sales people opted for more high risk 
prospects. Other research by Raju and Srinivasan (1996) shows that a basic quota plan performed 
with little loss in optimality even when there is strong heterogeneity across salespersons and 
territories. A principle-agent modeling approach is used by both Mantrala et al. (1994) and 
Manatrala et al. (1997) to determine each salesperson’s preferences for income and leisure to 
design an incentive compatible plan.  Both studies show that quotas can be used to effectively 
motivate salespeople even when direct effort is unobservable. These studies lend support to our 
contention that our model will motivate retailers to reduce returns, even if their effort is not 
directly observable. 
In the next section, we introduce a mathematical model of the false failure returns 
coordinating process, and suggest a target rebate contract to coordinate the supply chain.  
3. Model 
Consider a supply chain comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer.  We present a 
single–period model for ease of exposition, although the model can be easily extended to 
multiple periods in a stationary setting because there is no dynamic linkage (e.g., beginning 
inventory) between periods. That is, if all parameters are stationary over an infinite horizon, and 
the firm maximizes average profit, then the optimal level of effort––our decision variable––is the 
same across periods. A period, in our context, can be thought of as a quarter.     
When a consumer returns a false failure, there are three possible outcomes:  
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1. The consumer exchanges the returned product with a product from the same manufacturer, 
which could be of the same or a different model. If the consumer chooses a different model, 
then we assume, for ease of presentation, that it has an identical price p, wholesale price w, 
and manufacturing cost c as the returned product’s model. 
2. The consumer exchanges the returned product with a product from a competitor, with price 
cp  and wholesale price .  The consumer is paid cw cp p−  if cp p≤  or pays cp p−  
otherwise.       
3. The consumer returns the product, is paid p, and walks away with no product.                 
In each of the three cases, the retailer receives full credit w for the false failure return from the 
manufacturer, as discussed in the introduction. False failure returns cost the manufacturer and 
retailer m and r per unit, respectively, including any goodwill cost. We now compute the profit, 
to the manufacturer and retailer, of reducing one false failure return for each of the possible 
outcomes above. This is shown in Table 2 below, which we explain as follows. In the first 
outcome, both the retailer and the manufacturer experience a net sale (total sales minus total 
returns) of one product plus the respective return processing cost. If the false failure return had 
been avoided, both the manufacturer and retailer would also have experienced a net sale of one 
product. Consequently, the only profit to each party of avoiding a first outcome’s false failure 
return is its respective return processing cost.   
In the second outcome, each party incurs its respective return processing cost, the 
manufacturer experiences a zero net sale and the retailer experiences a net sale of one 
competitive product. Consequently, avoiding a second outcome’s false failure return implies a 
profit to the manufacturer of m + (w – c), the sum of its return processing cost plus the margin of 
the product that the consumer keeps. Avoiding a second outcome’s false failure return implies a 
profit to the retailer of , the sum of its return processing cost plus the net ( ) ( )c cr p w p w+ − − −
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margin of the product that the consumer keeps minus the margin of the competitive product, 
which the retailer would have sold in the second outcome. A similar reasoning holds for the third 
outcome.     
 
Table 2: Profit of avoiding one false failure return 
  Profit 
Outcome Probability Manufacturer Retailer 
1: exchange with product from 
same manufacturer q1 m r 
2: exchange with a competitive 
product q2 m + (w – c) r + ( p – w) – ( pc – wc) 
3: consumer walks away q3 m + (w – c) r + p – w 
 
From Table 2, we compute the expected profit of avoiding one false failure return to be m + 
(q2 + q3)(w – c) and  for the manufacture and retailer, 
respectively. Assume for simplicity that the competitive product has the same margin to the 
retailer, that is, (p – w) = (p
2 3 2( )( ) ( c cr q q p w q p w+ + − − − )
3c – wc).  Additionally, define 2δ ≡ +m q q , and 3δ ≡r q , where 
0 1r mδ δ< < < ; mδ  and rδ  can be interpreted as the sales impact to the manufacture and retailer, 
respectively, of avoiding one false failure return.  The expected profit of avoiding one false 
failure return is then m + δm (w – c) and r + δr (p – w) for the manufacture and retailer, 
respectively. 
Let ,  1,ρ ρ ≥  denote the retailer’s effort to reduce false failure returns. Effort may be thought 
of as the time the retailer spends working with the customer to choose the right product and 
demonstrating how to use it. We assume that the retailer’s cost of exerting effort is convex in her 
amount of effort ρ. A simple illustrative case is , where a > 0 can be interpreted as the 
marginal cost of effort associated with the minimum effort level 
2 / 2aρ
1ρ = .       
Given an effort ρ by the retailer, the number of false failure returns is ( ) 0X ρ ≥ , a random 
variable with cumulative distribution function (cdf) and probability density function (pdf) 
( | )F x ρ  and ( | )f x ρ  respectively. We assume that F is differentiable and strictly increasing in 
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x. Further, we assume that { ( )}E X βρρ = , where β is the expected number of false failure returns 
when the retailer exerts the minimum effort level 1ρ = . This assumption models diminishing 
returns to scale in the retailer’s effort, similarly to more commonly studied sales effort models.  
Thus, the expected value of the reduction in false failure return from the minimum effort level 
1ρ = , for any effort level ρ  is 1(1 )βρ ρβ β− = − .   
We consider here only the costs and revenues impacted by the retailer’s effort to reduce false 
failure returns. As a result, the coordinated supply chain’s expected profit ( )ρΠ  as a function of 
the retailer’s effort is  
 ( ) 21 1( ) ( ) ( ) 1
2m r
m w c r p w aρ δ δ β
ρ
⎛ ⎞
Π = + − + + − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
ρ . (1) 
The first term in (1) is the total expected profit as a result of the reduced number of false failure 
return for an effort level ρ; the second term is the retailer’s cost of effort. The expected profit (1) 
is concave in ρ, and is maximized at  
 
1/3( ) ( )C m rm w c r p w
a
δ δρ β+ − + + −⎡= ⎢⎣ ⎦
⎤
⎥ ,   (2) 
where Cρ  denotes the optimal retailer effort in a coordinated supply chain. We assume the 
interesting case where ( )m r aβ+ > , such that the total potential cost saving of reducing false 
failure returns is greater than the retailer’s marginal cost a of exerting the minimum effort level.  
As a result,  (the coordinated supply chain exerts more than the minimum effort).       1Cρ >
In a non-coordinated supply chain, the retailer incurs the cost for reducing false failure returns 
but is only rewarded with part of the benefit. Thus, it seems unlikely that the optimal level of 
effort will be observed in the absence of some form of coordination contract. Specifically, the 
retailer’s expected profit ( )Rπ ρ  is 
 [ ]
2 1( ) ( ) 1
2R r
a r p wρπ ρ δ β
ρ
⎛
= − + + − −⎜
⎝ ⎠
⎞
⎟ . (3) 
In the absence of an incentive by the manufacturer, the retailer exerts the optimal effort level 
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 ( ){ }1/3max [ ( )] ,1D rr p w aρ δ β= + − .   (4) 
Clearly, C Dρ ρ≥ . The manufacturer’s expected profit in this decentralized case is  
 [ ] 1( ) ( ) 1DM m Dm w cπ ρ δ β ρ
⎛ ⎞
= + − −⎜
⎝ ⎠
⎟ . (5) 
Since the manufacturer enjoys most of the benefits from reducing the number of false failure 
returns, the manufacturer must share some of these benefits with the retailer in order to achieve a 
coordinated solution. The manufacturer cannot mandate a given level of effort since effort is not 
observable due to the randomness in the false failure returns process.   
Given that effort is not directly contractible, a second option is for the manufacturer to either 
not pay the retailer a full credit for returns or charge the retailer a penalty for each false failure 
return. Not providing a full credit for a false failure return is problematic because false failures 
are included in the defective product returns and the retailer should not be held responsible for 
the manufacturer’s poor quality. Since the product must go through the reverse logistics process, 
a significant amount of time may expire before the manufacturer knows how many units from a 
given return are false failures. Even if we ignore the timing issues, there are other complications 
with charging the retailer a penalty for each false failure return. Charging a penalty to the retailer 
for each false failure penalizes the retailer for some effects that are not under the retailer’s 
control. Examples include when the packaging of the product misleads the customer or when the 
customer incurs buyer’s remorse despite the fact that the retailer did everything possible to 
ensure the customer purchased the correct product. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the 
retailers would agree to a pay a portion of the cost for each false failure. 
As a third option, the manufacturer may contract on the number of false failure returns 
through the use of a target rebate, and thus coordinate the supply chain. In this contract, the 
retailer receives a reward $u for every false failure return below a predetermined target level T.  
A low number of false failure returns is a signal of good effort on the retailer’s part to help the 
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customer purchase the correct product and its operation. A target rebate creates an incentive for 
the retailer to exert effort in this respect. The contract is based on false failure returns, and not 
total consumer returns (which includes true failures) because as argued before, the retailer should 
not be penalized by a manufacturer’s poor quality. Although the breakdown of returns (true vs. 
false failures) is provided by the manufacturer after the testing stage, we believe that it is not in 
the manufacturer’s best interest to over-report the number of false failures because the retailer 
always has the option of verifying the information, albeit at an additional cost. HP has 
experimented with different forms of target rebate contracts to reduce the level of false failure 
returns (Reiss 2003).          
Under a target rebate contract, the retailer’s expected profit is  
 [ ]{ } [ ]
2 1( | , ) ( ) ( ) 1
2R X r
aT u uE T X r p wρπ ρ ρ δ β
ρ
+ ⎛= − − + + − −⎜
⎝ ⎠
⎞
⎟ , (6) 
and the manufacturer’s expected profit is 
 ( ) [{1( | , ) ( ) 1 ( )M m XT u m w c uE T Xπ ρ δ β ρρ
+⎛ ⎞= + − − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
] } . (7) 
We find the values of u and T that coordinate this supply chain by equating to (2) the value of 
ρ that maximizes (6), which can be obtained via first order conditions. First order conditions are 
sufficient for optimality provided that (6) is concave in ρ; a sufficient condition is given below. 
Proposition 1: If 2 ( | ) 0F x ρ ρ∂ ∂ 2 ≤ , then the retailer’s expected profit (6) under a target rebate 
contract is concave in ρ.     
Proof:   We first show that the first term of (6) is concave in ρ.   
[ ]{ } 0 0( ) ( ) ( | ) ( | )
T T
XE T X T x f x dx F x dρ ρ
+− = − =∫ ∫ xρ , where the last equality follows from 
integration by parts. If 2 ( | ) 0F x ρ ρ 2∂ ∂ ≤ , then this first term of (6) is concave in ρ, since 
concavity is maintained in integration. It is easy to check that the last two terms of (6) are 
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concave in ρ and the sum of a set of concave functions is also concave, therefore (6) is concave 
in ρ.    
To calculate u and T via first order conditions, it is necessary to know the distribution of 
( )X ρ . Based on discussions with our contacts at HP, we demonstrate our model using the 
uniform and normal distribution cases below. The uniform distribution, which has a constant 
coefficient of variation, allows us to have closed–form solutions while the normal distribution 
case covers cases with varying degrees of uncertainty (coefficient of variation) in the false failure 
returns process.      
Uniform distribution for number of false failure returns  
Consider that ( )X ρ  ~ Uniform ( )20, βρ  (such that { ( )}E X βρρ = ). In this case, 
2( | )F x x
ρ
βρ = , 
2 ( | ) 0F x ρ ρ∂ ∂ 2 = ; thus (6) is concave in ρ according to Proposition 1. Then, 
[ ]{ }( )XE T X ρ +−  = ( ) 220 4
T
u T x dx T uρβ ρ β= − ⋅ =∫ . Substituting this expression in (6) yields 
 [ ]
2 2 1( | , ) ( ) 1
4 2R r
T u aT u r p wρ ρπ ρ δ β
β ρ
⎛ ⎞
= − + + − −⎜
⎝ ⎠
⎟ . (8) 
The value ρ* that maximizes (8) must satisfy the first–order conditions:  
 [ ]2 * 2 * 3 2( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( ) 0rT u a r p wρ β ρ δ β− + + − = . (9) 
Substituting ρ* with (2), we find an expression that relates u and T, so that the supply chain is 
coordinated by the contract:    
 ( )
( )
1/ 22 /3 1/3
1/31/ 2
2 ( )
( ) ( )
m
m r
a m w c
T





+ − + + −
. (10) 
For a fixed value of u, the corresponding value of T is obtained from (10). The value of u (and T) 
has to satisfy 2 /T β ρ< , that is, the upper limit in the integral  cannot exceed 
the upper limit of the uniform distribution. Substituting T from (10) and ρ from (2), yields 
{[ ( )] }XE T X ρ
+−
(mu m w c)δ> + − . This is interesting since it shows that the value of u that coordinates this 
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contract is larger than the cost of a return to the manufacturer. Still, the manufacturer can be 
better off with a target rebate contract as Proposition 2 shows below.       
 
Proposition 2: Suppose ( )X ρ  is uniformly distributed.  A (u, T) contract that coordinates the 
supply chain always makes the retailer better off, and makes the manufacturer better off if and 
only if 2C Dρ ρ≥ .  
Proof:   See Appendix.  
Proposition 2 indicates that the manufacturer is better off with a target rebate only if the 
optimal centralized effort is large enough relative to the retailer’s own optimal decentralized 
effort level. If the retailer’s profit of avoiding one false failure return ( )rr p wδ+ −  is large 
enough relative to the marginal effort cost per return a /β, such that  according to (4), then 1Dρ >
2C Dρ ρ≥  is equivalent to [ ]( ) 7 (m rm w c r p wδ δ+ − ≥ + − ) . This indicates that the target rebate 
contract makes the manufacturer better off only if its own profit margin of reducing a false 
failure return is substantially larger than the retailer’s.      
 
Normal distribution for number of false failure returns 
Now, consider ( )X ρ  ~ ( / , ( ))N β ρ σ ρ . Denote by Φ(⋅) and φ(⋅) the cdf and pdf of the 
standard normal distribution, respectively. Then, ( )/( )( | ) xF x β ρσ ρρ −= Φ . Proposition 1’s condition, 
2 ( | ) 0F x ρ ρ∂ ∂ 2 ≤ , may not be necessarily satisfied for a general function ( )σ ρ . It is satisfied, 
however, for two important cases. First, if ( )σ ρ σ≡  for all ρ, then 2 2( | )F x ρ ρ∂ ∂  = 
( ) ( )2 3/ /' 0x xβ ρ β β ρ βσ σσρ σρφ φ− −⋅ − ⋅ ≤2 , since ( ) 0zφ >  and '( ) 0zφ ≤  for all z. This scenario represents 
the case where the standard deviation of the number of false failure returns is independent of the 
effort level. A more interesting case, which we focus on this paper, is when ( ) v βρσ ρ = , where v 
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is a constant denoting the coefficient of variation of ( )X ρ ; this is representative of the case 
where the standard deviation of ( )X ρ  is proportional to its mean (and thus, inversely 
proportional to the effort level). In this case, after some algebra, (6) becomes:    
 [ ]
21 1( | , ) 1 ( ) 1
2R r
T aT u u T vL r p w
v
β ρ β ρπ ρ δ β
ρ ρ
⎧ ⎫ ⎛⎡ − ⎤⎛ ⎞= − − − + + − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
⎞
⎟ , (11) 
where L(⋅) is the standard normal loss function. The first–order condition with respect to ρ 
results in an implicit equation that can be solved for T, given a value of u or vice-versa: 
 ( )( )1 1
C C
mm w cT Tv
v v u
δρ β ρ βφ
+ −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− −
Φ − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, (12) 
where Cρ  is given by (2), and φ (⋅) and Φ(⋅) are the standard normal pdf and cdf, respectively.  
Given that Φ(⋅) and φ (⋅) are necessarily less than one, then a necessary condition for (12) to have 
a solution is that the right–hand side of (12) is less than one, which implies ( )mu m w cδ> + − , 
just like in the uniform distribution case. Further, if we define ( )/ 1Cz T ρ β= − v
))
, and 
(arbitrarily) set , where k > 1 is a constant, we can rewrite (12) as   ( (mu k m w cδ= + −
 ( ) ( ) 1/z v z kφΦ − = . (13) 
Denoting the solution of (13) by z*, then ( )* 1T vzβρ= + . Note that z* only depends on the 
coefficient of variation v and the constant k, and thus the design of such a contract is relatively 
straightforward. Unlike the uniform distribution case, however, the retailer is not always better 
off under a normal distribution for ( )X ρ ; we discuss this in depth in our comprehensive 
numerical analysis of §4. First though, we illustrate how the target rebate contract works for both 
the uniform and normal distribution cases with a numerical example below.     
 
Example 1: Consider m = 50, r = 5, p = 200, w = 150, c = 100, β = 120, a = 120, δm = 0.7,  δr = 
0.3, and 1/ 3v =  (so that the uniform and normal distribution cases have the same coefficient of 
variation, 1/ 3 ). The optimal level of effort, given by (2), is Cρ = 5.1. The coordinated supply 
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chain’s expected profit at the optimal level of effort (1) is ( )CρΠ =  $ 8,568. To coordinate the 
supply chain, different combinations of u and T are possible. A necessary condition for u, under 
both uniform and normal distributions, is ( ) 85mu m w cδ> + − = . We consider five combinations 
of u and T, for both cases; and present the results in Table 3. Note that the distribution of profits 
does not depend on the contract parameters for the uniform distribution case. This is not an 
obvious result, and is a consequence of the unique shape of the uniform distribution––the term 
{( ) }XXE T
β
ρθ
+− , the only term dependent of (u, T) in the retailer’s expected profit function (8), is 
a linear function of ρ  when ( )X ρ  is uniformly distributed. For the normal distribution case, 
however, a higher value of u (resulting in a lower T) results in increasing profits for the 
manufacturer and decreasing profits for the retailer.              
 
Table 3: Different combinations of u and T that coordinate the supply chain in example 1 
  Uniform Distr. for X(ρ) Normal Distr. For X(ρ) 
u  T πR πM T πR πM
90  49.4 2,366 6,202 50.5 2,805 5,763 
95  48.1 2,366 6,202 46.1 2,543 6,026 
100  46.9 2,366 6,202 43.4 2,401 6,168 
105  45.8 2,366 6,202 41.4 2,309 6,260 
110  44.7 2,366 6,202 39.8 2,243 6,325 
4. Numerical analysis 
In this section, we perform a numerical analysis that has several objectives: 1) to analyze the 
influence of the distribution of the uncertainty in the returns process ( )X ρ  on our results; 2) to 
quantify the benefits of coordination, and 3) to identify how the benefits of coordination vary 
with different model parameter values.       
The base numbers are grounded on product prices and returns volume for HP deskjet printers, 
and the other model parameters are varied over a wide range. We set p = $200 (median price 
across different inkjet models), m = 0.25p = $50, and a 50% gross margin, which implies c = 
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$100. We use the two distributions (uniform and normal) for the uncertainty in the returns 
process studied theoretically. We vary the remaining parameters at four levels each according to 
the full–factorial experimental design shown in Table 4, which we justify as follows.   
We consider values for the coefficient of variation v (when ( )X ρ  is normally distributed) 
from 0.15 to 0.45 (we do not consider values for v higher than 0.45 because then there is a 
significant probability of negative values for ( )X ρ ). We use values for the cost of effort per 
expected return, a /β  from $0.10 to $5. We use values for the retailer’s return processing cost 
relative to the manufacturer (r /m) from 2.5% to 10%. While the retailer has some minimal labor 
cost associated with receiving a false failure, giving the customer credit, and separating the false 
failure for shipment, the manufacturer incurs all shipping costs, the refurbishing cost, and the re–
marketing cost for the refurbished product in the secondary market. We use values for the 
parameterδm, which measures the impact of effort on net sales for the manufacturer, from the 0.3 
to 0.9. Similarly, for the retailer we consider values for /r mδ δ  from 0.3 to 0.9 (since r mδ δ< ). 
Finally, we consider values for the wholesale price as a fraction of the product’s price, w / p, 
from 0.65 to 0.95. The experimental design of Table 4 yields 5,120 cells, 1,024 for the uniform 
distribution and 4,096 for the normal distribution. Across all cells we select the contract 
parameter  with k = 1.1; we later report results using different values for k.       ( (u k m w cδ= + − ))
 
Table 4: Experimental design 
Parameter Symbol Levels 
Distribution of X (ρ) - Uniform, Normal 
Coefficient of variation for X (ρ) v 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45 
Cost of effort per expected return a / β $ 0.1, 1.0, 2.5, 5.0 
Retailer’s return processing cost relative to 
the manufacturer’s r / m 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, 0.10 
Influence of effort on sales – manufacturer δm 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
Influence of effort on sales – retailer 
relative to the manufacturer  
/r mδ δ  0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
Wholesale/retail price ratio w / p 0.65, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95 
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Our main performance measure is the expected profit improvement per expected return (when 
ρ = 1) for each party or the supply chain as a result of adopting the target rebate contract. For 
example, for the retailer this is defined as ( ) ( )( )| , /CR R RT u Dπ ρ π ρ∆ = − β , or, in relative 
terms, ( )% 100% / /DR R Rπ ρ β∆ = ∆ ; similarly for the manufacturer and the supply chain. We 
report relative and absolute values of expected profit improvement here because both are 
important in providing a complete picture of the contract benefits, as we argue below. Detailed 
results are available upon request.   
The statistics for relative expected profit improvement %∆  for the retailer, manufacturer, and 
supply chain are reported in Table 5, tabulated by the distribution of ( )X ρ : uniform, normal 
over all cases, and normal for each value of v. We do not report the maximum values for %∆  
because they occur in cases where the non-coordinated supply chain has such a small positive 
expected profit that any improvement has a huge relative impact and relative numbers can be 
misleading. A similar phenomenon occurs in Table 5––the extremely small minimum values of 
 in the normal distribution case (first row) occurs when % R∆ ( )
D
Rπ ρ  has a small absolute value.  
Again, this points out to the need for also reporting absolute values of expected profit 
improvement, which we do below.        
 
 19
Table 5: Statistics for expected profit improvement %∆  across experimental design 
  Distribution of ( )X ρ  
Statistic Party Uniform Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
     Overall v = 0.15 v = 0.25 v = 0.35 v = 0.45 
 Retailer 10% -∞a -∞a -∞a -2652% -307%
Minimum Manufacturer -31 -22% 2% 0% -11% -22%
  Supply chain 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
 Retailer 68% -43% -398% -93% 12% 45%
25th perc. Manufacturer -2% 9% 16% 12% 7% 2%
  Supply chain 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13%
 Retailer 217% 10% -81% -5% 46% 140%
Median Manufacturer 8% 26% 37% 29% 21% 14%
  Supply chain 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31%
 Retailer 699% 94% -17% 10% 169% 470%
75th perc. Manufacturer 37% 71% 91% 81% 67% 50%
  Supply chain 115% 115% 115% 115% 115% 115%
aVery large negative number 
 
Table 5 reveals that relative expected profit improvements are significant––the median values 
for % M∆  are 8% and 26%, and median values for % R∆  are 217% and 10%, for the uniform and 
normal distribution cases, respectively. The median value of supply chain expected profit 
improvement is 31%, which does not depend on the distribution of ( )X ρ . We caution that our 
analysis is restricted only to profit per false failure return as impacted by the retailer’s effort, not 
total profit (forward + reverse supply chain) for each party. As expected, the retailer is better off 
(  > 0) in all uniform distribution cases, while the manufacturer is better off in more than 
50% of cases––the 25
% R∆
th percentile and median for % M∆  are –2% and 8%, respectively. For the 
normal distribution case, the manufacturer is better off in more than 75% of cases, and is always 
better off if v ≤ 0.25; the retailer is better off in the majority of our test cases. The retailer’s 
(manufacturer’s) improvement increases (decreases) as the coefficient of variation of ( )X ρ , v 
increases––the median value of  is –81%, –5%, 46%, and 140% (37%, 29%, 21%, and 14%) 
for v = 0.15, 0.25, 0.35, and 0.45, respectively. The higher the level of uncertainty v in the 
returns process, the higher the expected number of returns below the target T, ceteris paribus, as 
(11) shows. Because the retailer is not penalized when returns are above the target, but is paid 
%∆
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(by the manufacturer) $u per return below the target, the retailer’s (manufacturer’s) expected 
profit increases (decreases) as uncertainty in the returns process increases, ceteris paribus.     
Next we study how absolute expected profit improvement ∆ is related to the factors in our 
experimental design. For each factor, we average ∆ across all experiments for each factor level.  
We focus on the normal distribution results and note that the results are similar for the uniform 
distribution, except that the magnitude of improvement is higher for the retailer in the uniform 
case. The results are shown in Figure 1 for factors v (left) and /a β  (right), Figure 2 for r / m 
(left) and  (right), and Figure 3 for /w p mδ  (left) and /r mδ δ  (right). We note that the average 
expected profit improvement for the supply chain is equal to the sum of improvements across the 
retailer and the manufacturer. We have already commented on the effect of v on %∆, now shown 
graphically for ∆ in Figure 1 (left).  Figure 1 (right) shows that expected profit improvement for 
all parties decrease as the retailer’s normalized effort cost /a β  decreases. A lower value of 
/a β  means that the retailer already has an incentive to exert a significant effort level in the 
decentralized case Dρ ; thus the contract does not provide an incentive for a significantly higher 
effort level.            
 
Figure 1: Average expected profit improvement ($) per expected return as a function of the coefficient of 
variation of X (left) and the retailer’s effort cost per expected return (right) 
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Figure 2 (left) shows that the retailer’s false failure processing cost relative to the 
manufacturer’s r / m impact minimally the performance of the contract; this is because r is small 
relatively to the other revenue and cost figures. Figure 2 (right) shows that the supply chain’s 
expected profit improvement increases with the wholesale price relative to product price w /p; 
this is because a higher w /p implies a higher profit margin for the manufacturer, who has the 
most to gain from reducing false failures; the opposite is true for the retailer. 
  Figure 3 (left) shows that the impact of the parameter mδ  on ∆ is relatively mild for the 
supply chain, however, expected profit improvement for the manufacturer (retailer) decreases 
(increases) as mδ  increases. From §3 and Table 2, 2 3 1m q q q1δ = + = −  is essentially the 
probability that the customer does not exchange a product with a product from the same 
manufacturer upon return; as this probability increases, the benefits of reducing false failures for 
the manufacturer decreases. Finally, Figure 3 (right) shows that expected profit improvement 
decreases as /r mδ δ  increases across all parties and the supply chain. From §3 and Table 2, 
3r qδ =  is the probability that the customer walks way with nothing after returning a false failure. 
At high levels of this probability, the retailer already has an incentive to decrease false failures in 
the decentralized case (and thus Dρ  is high) because false failure returns result in zero net sales 
for the retailer––thus, the benefit of a coordinating contract is lower.   
Finally, we analyze the impact of choosing different levels of ( )(u k m w cδ= + − )  in the 
performance of the contract. We study values of k = 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, and 1.7, and repeat, for each 
value of k, all 4,096 experiments in Table 4 for the normal distribution case; recall from example 
1 that different values of u do not impact the performance of the contract and / or expected profit 
distribution between the two parties with a uniform distribution. As expected from example 1, 
the mean value of M∆  increases as k increases: 18.7, 20.0, 20.6, and 21.1 for k = 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 
and 1.7, respectively. Conversely, the mean value of R∆  decreases as k increases: 1.3, 0.0, –0.6, 
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and –1.1, respectively. The mean value of 20.0SC∆ =  does not depend on k. This indicates that a 
lower value of k, and consequently a lower value of u and a corresponding higher value of T, is 
indicated if both parties are to benefit from the contract. In summary, our numerical results 
indicate that a target rebate contract may result in significant improvements in the reverse supply 
chain’s expected profit. 
 
Figure 2: Average expected profit improvement ($) per expected return as a function of the retailer’s 
processing cost relative to the manufacturer r / m (left), and wholesale price (right) 
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Figure 3: Average expected profit improvement ($) per expected return as a function of mδ  (left) and /r mδ δ  
(right) 
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5.   Forward contracts 
In this section we study the impact of the false failure problem on traditional forward 
contracts used between a manufacturer and a retailer. The first part explores how some common 
forward contracts give the retailer an incentive to actually increase rather than decrease the 
number of false failure returns. The second part assumes the manufacturer is willing and able to 
negotiate a new forward contract with the retailer. Thus, we give suggestions on how a forward 
contract can be constructed that solves both the double marginalization problem and the effort 
incentive problem of reducing false failure returns. 
5.1. Incentives to game traditional sales contracts  
Up to this point, we have assumed that all false failure returns are unintentional on the 
retailer’s part and are due primarily to the retailer’s lack of effort in helping customers.  In this 
section, we explore whether there are incentives for the retailer to intentionally encourage false 
failure returns (a practice we term “gaming”). For example, HP offers a buy–back sales contract 
with its retailers where any unsold product may be returned to HP for a partial refund at the end 
of the product’s last selling season (the time when the demand rate for a particular product 
decreases to a point where the retailer no longer wishes to replenish it; this happens when an 
older model is being phased out to make room for its replacement version.) If the retailer is 
offered a full refund for a false-failure return (the current practice), then the retailer has an 
incentive to push a slow–selling product (during its last selling season) to consumers, fully 
knowing that the product does not fully meet the consumer’s needs and thus has a high 
probability of being returned. Thus, a relevant question is:  Does our proposed target rebate 
contract encourage or discourage the retailer to game her sales-based contract? 
   We examine several of the most popular sales–based contracts to determine where 
incentives for gaming exist at the end of the selling season, and show how our proposed target 
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rebate contract for false failure returns helps mitigate these gaming incentives.  Let  represent 
the loss of goodwill to the manufacturer and  represent the loss of goodwill to the retailer if 
the customer purchases a product that does not meet their needs. Note that this is a different 
penalty cost than the more traditional loss of goodwill due to unsatisfied demand. Let v represent 
the per unit salvage value of any unsold product for the retailer at the end of the product’s last 
selling season.  
mg
rg
Consider the simplest contract, the wholesale price-only contract, where the manufacturer 
charges the supplier a fixed wholesale price for each unit purchased. In general, this contract 
does not coordinate the supply chain, but it is easy to monitor and still common in practice. In 
the absence of a target rebate contract, the incentive to game occurs when the retailer is left with 
unsold inventory at the end of the last selling season and the retailer’s salvage value is less than 
the net benefit from a false failure return (the wholesale price minus the loss of goodwill to the 
retailer), i.e. . Our target rebate contract changes this condition to rv w g≤ −
 rv w g u≤ − −  if CT
β
ρ
< , (14)  
which reduces the incentive for gaming.   
Table 6 summarizes the results for the wholesale price-only contract along with three 
commonly used forward coordination contracts. The first coordination contract is a buy–back or 
revenue sharing contract (Cachon, 2003 shows the two are equivalent under most simple 
settings). In a buy–back contract, the manufacturer sells the product to the retailer at the per unit 
wholesale price w, but pays the retailer b, b ≤ w, for each unsold unit at the end of the last selling 
season. The second contract is a quantity flexibility contract where the retailer receives a full 
refund from the manufacturer on any leftover inventory at the end of the selling season that is 
below a predetermined target level λq, where q is the retailer’s order quantity over the product’s 
last selling season and λ ∈ [0,1] is a contract parameter. To define this contract, let  be [0, ]Y ∈ Ω
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a random variable representing demand over the last selling season, with pdf ( )Yf y . The third 
contract is a quantity discount contract where the wholesale price is a decreasing function of the 
order quantity. Since this contract induces the retailer to order more by lowering the wholesale 
price instead of repurchasing unsold units, the condition for gaming is the same as the wholesale 
price–only contract except that the single price w is replaced by the average wholesale price paid, 
w , in (14) where w w< . 
Table 6: The effect of a Target Rebate contract on the incentive to game forward contracts 





rv w g≤ −  





Buy-back and  
revenue sharing 
rb v w g+ ≤ −  





Quantity flexibility ( )Y rqv f y dy w gλ
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One last contract type that is sometimes used in practice is the sales rebate contract. This 
contract is similar to the target rebate contract discussed in this paper, except that it offers a 
reward for each unit sold above a predetermined target threshold. The exact contractual 
definition of sale results in very different incentives for gaming. If a sale is defined as total sales, 
including units eventually returned, a clear incentive exists (above even the wholesale price only 
contract) when the retailer is above her target threshold and receives an additional bonus for each 
product sold. If a sale is defined as net–sales, where the number of false failure returns is 
subtracted out at the end, then the use of a sales rebate contract should not add any additional 
incentive for gaming. Unfortunately, sales rebate contracts do not coordinate the supply chain in 
isolation and are thus often used in combination with other coordination contracts when sales are 
dependent on the sales effort of the retailer. Thus, the incentive for gaming may still exist with 
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these contracts but can be reduced by specifying net–sales in the conditions of the sales rebate 
contract. 
Summarizing, our analysis reveals that traditional sales-based contracts designed to 
coordinate the forward supply chain may induce gaming at the end of a product’s last selling 
season. We argue, however, that our target rebate contract, designed to coordinate false failure 
returns in the reverse chain, reduces these gaming incentives when they exist. Further, we 
believe that the low volumes typically found during the last selling season combined with the 
side benefits of our target rebate contract implies that there is no need to incur the cost of altering 
existing contracts to eliminate the gaming incentives. If a manufacturer and a retailer are 
establishing a new relationship however, it is better to address the misalignment of incentives in 
the original forward contract. Thus, in the next section we offer a modification to a traditional 
forward contract that eliminates this misalignment and achieves the coordinated solution on the 
reduction of false failure returns. 
5.2. False Failure Coordinated Forward Contract 
In our experience talking with manufacturers who suffered from high levels of false failure 
returns, there is a strong reluctance to change the forward contracts already in place with the 
retailers. There are several reasons for this reluctance. The retailer often standardizes forward 
contracts so any manufacturer that refuses to abide by the standard contract faces the danger of 
having its product line dropped by the retailer. Also, renegotiating a forward contract is an 
expensive and time consuming process and the major retailers often do not fully trust the 
manufacturers so they may refuse a new forward contract even if it is Pareto improving for all 
parties. Our proposed target rebate contract avoids these problems because it results only in 
additional revenue for the retailer who has complete discretion on whether or not to alter her 
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behavior. It also does not require any modification to the current forward contract, making it 
attractive for the established supply chain relationships.     
Despite the difficulties described above, a single forward contract, that also solves the 
incentive problem on the amount of effort to spend on reducing false failures, is the ideal and 
there may be situations where negotiating such a contract is feasible. Thus, we now explore how 
such a contract should work. Before presenting our forward contract, we define some additional 
notation. Let D be random demand for a single selling period and let . The 
retailer must order a quantity q before knowing the true demand. For simplicity, assume all 
unmet demand is lost, any goodwill cost for a lost sale is zero, and the salvage value for unsold 
inventory is v. Let S(q) be the retailer’s expected sales where 
( ) ( )= ≤G y P D y
 . { }
0
( ) min( , ) ( )= = − ∫
q
DS q E q D q G y dy
Finally, let I(q) be the expected left over inventory, ( ) ( )I q q S q= − . In the absence of false 
failure returns, the coordinated supply chain’s expected profit is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )q pS q vI q cΠ = + − q . (15) 
To include the effect of false failures on the supply chain’s expected profit, we first must 
denote our expected number of false failures to be a function of q. To do so, we set 
 ( ){ ( , )} qE X q βρ
ρ
= . (16) 
We further assume that the number of false failures is a fixed percentage of sales (which depends 
on the effort level); thus ( , ) ( ) min( , )ρ γ ρ=X q q D  where  is the sales quantity and min( , )q D
( )γ ρ  is a parameter value that depends on the effort level. Taking expectations gives 
 { ( , )} ( ) ( )E X q S qρ γ ρ= . (17) 
Equating (16) to (17) gives  




where ( )γ ρ γ= ρ  and γ  represents the constant percentage of false failures (relative to actual 
sales).  Thus, ( , ) ( )X q S qρ γ= ρ . Incorporating the cost of false failures in the coordinated 
supply chain’s expected profit gives 
 
2
( , ) ( ) ( )
2
aq p S q vI q cqηγρ
ρ
⎛ ⎞
Π = − + − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
ρ , (18) 
 ( )where  ( ) ( )m rm w c r p wη δ δ= + − + + − . 
The supply chain’s expected profit contains the normal cost of falling above or below demand 
plus the additional cost of the false failure returns and the effort spent to reduce them. Assuming 
that the expected profit (18) is well-behaved and jointly concave in q and ρ , the optimal order 
quantity and effort is found by solving 









for the optimal order quantity as a function of effort and 
 3 ( )S q
a
ηγρ =  (20) 
for the optimal effort level as a function of the order quantity. Equations (19) and (20) can then 
be solved simultaneously resulting in the optimal decisions Cand Cq ρ .  Although closed form 
solutions do not exist for the general distribution cases, (19) and (20) can be solved numerically 
for given distributions of demand and the number of false failures. 
For the non-coordinated supply chain, the retailer’s expected total profit is 
 ( )
2
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2R r
aq p r p w S q vI q wqγ ρπ ρ δ
ρ
⎡ ⎤
= − + − + − −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
. (21) 
The manufacturer’s expected total profit for a non-coordinated chain is  
 ( )( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )M mq w c q m w c S q
γπ ρ δ
ρ
= − − + − . (22) 
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The second part of (22) is the additional cost incurred by the manufacturer due to false failure 
returns. A contract that induces the retailer to expend a Cρ  level of effort must assign the total 
cost of false failures to the retailer. Thus, the retailer must be charged a cost of ( )mm w cδ+ −  for 
each false failure returned to the manufacturer. To induce the retailer to accept the new contract, 
the retailer must be compensated for assuming this extra cost. This can be done through a lump 
sum payment or by choosing the exchange price w low enough so that the retailer’s expected 
profit is higher than it would be without the contract.   
While assigning all the false failure related cost to the retailer solves one problem, it does not 
solve the double-marginalization problem where the retailer’s optimal order quantity is less than 
. Cachon (2003) discusses many contract types that solve this piece of the problem. We 
choose a buy-back contract to demonstrate our forward coordination contract since it is one of 
the more commonly used in practice. Adding the partial rebate for unsold units  and 
the total false failure cost to the retailer’s expected profit gives  
Cq
( ,  )b b w≤
 
2
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2R




= − + + − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
ρ . (23) 
The manufacturer’s expected profit is  
 ( , ) ( ) ( )M bq w c q bI qπ ρ = − − . (24) 
Pasternack (1985) shows that a range of buy-back parameter values {  solve the double-
marginalization problem and that every possible profit allocation is feasible. Therefore, quantity 
and effort coordination can be achieved by choosing the set of values that result in the retailer’s 
choice of 
, }bw b
C and Cq ρ as well as a Pareto improvement in the expected profits for both the retailer 
and the manufacturer over their expected profits in the absence of the contract. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we propose a target rebate contract to coordinate false failure returns, which are 
consumer returns returned to the retailer that have no functional or cosmetic defect. This contract 
stipulates a payment of $u for each false failure return below a target T. We propose a simple, 
but insightful model, which reveals the substantial benefits that can be derived by enticing 
retailers to exert a higher level of effort to decrease the number of false failure returns.  This 
higher level of effort has two benefits for the supply chain. First, it reduces the overall processing 
cost for false failure returns, which is significant considering that a false failure return may cost 
25% of the product price. Second, a higher level of effort may result in a higher level of net sales 
(sales that are not returned).  
We show that our contract has a number of attractive properties, including Pareto–
improvement in a majority of cases. We find that the magnitude of profit (associated with false 
failure returns) improvement per expected return as a result of the increased retailer’s effort is 
very significant, with a median value of 10%, 26% and 31% for the retailer, manufacturer, and 
supply chain respectively.  For the retailer (manufacturer), the profit improvement per expected 
return increases (decreases) with the uncertainty in the returns process. This is because as 
uncertainty increases, ceteris paribus, the retailer’s (manufacturer’s) profit increases (decreases) 
due to an increase in the expected number of false failure returns below the contract target T.   
Our research is a first step in understanding how a target rebate contract provides incentives 
to the retailer to improve her effort in the sales process targeted at reducing the number of false 
failure returns. We use a stylized model that summarizes the retailer’s effort by a single variable, 
a common approach in the current body of contract research. We also discuss the implications of 
using quantity-based coordination contracts on the false failure return problem, and offer 
guidance on which ones provide the least incentive to game. One possibility for future research is 
to generalize our results to other settings. Another is to monitor the implementation of such a 
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contract in practice, and compare the improvements against the theory. In any event, our research 
indicates that significant savings may be obtained by reducing the number of false failure 
returns.                
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2: Suppose ( )X ρ  is uniformly distributed.  A (u, T) contract that coordinates the 
supply chain always makes the retailer better off, and makes the manufacturer better off if 
2C Dρ ρ≥ .  
Proof:   First, consider the manufacturer. The manufacturer is better off with the (u, T) 
contract if ( ) (| ,CM MT u )Dπ ρ π≥ ρ . The manufacturer’s expected profit (7) can be rewritten as 
  ( )





T uT u m w c ρ ρπ ρ δ β
ρ β
⎛ ⎞−
= + − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. (25) 
We can rewrite (9) as  [ ]2 2 3( ) 4 ( ) 4 ( )C C rT u a r p w 2ρ β ρ δ β= − + − , and from (2), 
( )3( ) ( ) ( ) /C m rm w c r p w aρ δ δ= + − + + − β . Thus, 
( ) [ ]2 2 2 2( ) 4 ( ) ( ) 4 ( )C m r rT u m w c r p w r p wρ δ δ β δ= + − + + − − + − ( )24 ( )mm w cβ δ+ −β  = .  
Substituting this in (25) yields:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2( | , ) ( ) ( )
C C
mC
M m mC C
m w c
T u m w c m w c
β δρ ρπ ρ δ β δ β
ρ ρ
+ −⎛ ⎞ ⎛
Cρ
⎞− −






Again, we need ( ) (| ,C DM MT uπ ρ π≥ ρ ), where ( DMπ ρ  is given by (5).  Simple algebra 
shows that this is true if 2C Dρ ρ≥ . 
 Now, we consider the retailer.  Define ( ) ( )| ,CR R RT u Dπ ρ π∆ = − ρ . For the retailer to be 
better off, we need ∆R ≥ 0. From (9), [ ]2 2/ 4 ( ) /( )C CrT u a r p wβ ρ δ β ρ= − + − , which can be 
substituted into (8), yielding   
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[ ] [ ]
2
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2 ( )( )( | , ) ( )
2
( ) 4 ( )








r p waT u r p w
a r p w
r p w







= − + + −
− + −
= + + −
) a
 (26)  
Now, from (2), (3( ) ( ) ( ) /C m rm w c r p wρ δ δ= + − + + − β , which can be substituted in (26), 
yielding  
 




m w c r p w




+ − − + −
= + β+ − . (27) 
In the decentralized case, note that (3) can be rewritten as  
 [ ] [
3( ) 2 ( )





a r p w
r p w
ρ δ β ]rπ ρ ρ
− − + −
= + δ β+ − . (28) 
But [ ]({ ) }1/3max ( ) ,1D rr p w aρ δ β= + − . First, consider the case where Dρ  > 1; in this case 
[ ]( )1/3( )D rr p w aρ δ β= + − , which implies [ ]3( ) ( )D ra r p wρ δ= + − β  ; substituting this in (28) 
yields  






δ β ]rπ ρ ρ
+ −
= − + + −δ β . (29) 
Taking the difference (27) – (29) yields    
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
( ) 3 ( ) 3 ( )
( | , ) ( )
2 2
( ) 3 ( ) 3 ( ) ( )
       0.
2 2 2
C D
m r rC D
R R R C D
m r r m
C C C
m w c r p w r p w
T u
m w c r p w r p w m w c
ρ ρβ δ δ δ β
π ρ π ρ
ρ ρ
β δ δ δ β β δ
ρ ρ ρ
≥⎡ ⎤+ − − + − + −⎣ ⎦∆ = − = + ≥
⎡ ⎤+ − − + − + − + −⎣ ⎦ + = ≥
 (30) 
The other case to consider is if ; in this case . Thus, from (27),  1Dρ = ( ) / 2DR aπ ρ = −
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) 3 ( )( | , ) ( ) ( )
2 2
m rC D
R R R rC
m w c r p w aT u r p w
β δ δ
π ρ π ρ δ β
ρ
+ − − + −
∆ = − = + + − + . (31) 
If the first term on the right–hand side of (31) is positive, then 0R∆ ≥  because the remainder 
two terms of (31) are positive. If, on the other hand, the first term on the right–hand side of (31) 
is negative, then we can write 
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where in (*) we have used the fact that if [ ]( ){ }1/3max ( ) ,1D rr p w aρ δ β= + − , and 1Dρ = , 
then necessarily [ ]( )rr p w aδ β+ − ≤1. This completes the proof.    
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